Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result previously attained by D. Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present beliefs only. A common prior exists if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge that all Cesàro means of iterated expectations with respect to any permutation converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. It is further shown that compactness is a necessary condition for some of the results.
that all players expect a positive gain. The most accessible proof of this result is in Samet (1998b) . It was proved by Morris (1994) for finite type spaces and independently by Feinberg (2000) for compact type spaces. Bonanno and Nehring (1999) proved it for finite type spaces with two agents.
As Samet (1998a) points out, this characterization satisfactorily solves the question of how one can tell when players have a common prior, but it fails to express the common prior in a meaningful way; the fact that disagreement regarding the outcome of a bet cannot be common knowledge may guarantee the existence of a common prior, but it tells us nothing about this common prior. He then proceeds to present a very different necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior that not only identifies the common prior when it exists, but also provides an epistemically meaningful interpretation to it.
This condition is expressed intuitively in Samet (1998a) in a colorful story. Imagine that Adam and Eve, who have both excelled in their studies at the same school of economics, are asked what return they expect on IBM stock. Having been exposed to different sources of information, we should not be surprised if the two provide different answers. But we can then go on to ask Eve what she thinks Adam's answer was. Being a good Bayesian, she can compute the expectation of various answers and come up with Adam's expected answer. Likewise, Adam can provide us with what he expects was Eve's answer to that question. This process can continue, moving back and forth between Eve and Adam, theoretically forever. There are, in this example, two possible infinite sequences of alternating expectations, one that starts with Eve and one that starts with Adam. Samet calls this process "obtaining an iterated expectation", and shows that, when the relevant state space is finite, there exists a common prior if and only if both of these sequences converge to the same limit.
He achieves this result by representing Adam's beliefs 1 by a type matrix M 1 and Eve's beliefs by a type matrix M 2 .
These then form two permutation matrices, M σ 1 = M 2 M 1 , which is intended to be used for the process of obtaining iterated expectations starting with Adam, and M σ 2 = M 1 M 2 which does the same for the iterated expectations starting with Eve. It then turns out to be the case that both M σ 1 and M σ 2 are ergodic Markov matrices, and therefore each of them has a unique invariant probability measure, which may be labelled respectively p 1 and p 2 . It is then shown that if p 1 = p 2 , Adam and Eve cannot share a common prior. On the other hand, if p 1 = p 2 , then not only is there a common prior, it has positively been identified -it is precisely p :
We can term the criterion by which a common prior is ascertained to exist, by the identities of the invariant probability measures associated with permutation matrices, the iterated expectations characterization. Samet (1998a) , however, proves it only in the context of finite state spaces. Given the results in Feinberg (2000) and Heifetz (2006) , which extend the No Betting characterization to compact state spaces, it is natural to wonder whether an analogue of Samet's characterization can also be shown to hold in compact state spaces.
It is the goal of this paper to show that there is an affirmative answer to that question. The significance of such a result is clear, given that there are many models of interest which involve infinite state spaces and cannot be reduced to a finite space -we therefore extend the application of the iterated expectations characterization to many models to which it previously could not be applied.
It is also shown here, by way of an example, that compactness is necessary in the sense that if one does not assume compactness, the infinite dimensional analogue of the permutation matrix M σ may not have a well-defined invariant probability measure -and without that, the subsequent propositions do not follow, and indeed in that case there is no guarantee that the iterated expectations characterization for checking the existence of a common prior can even be applied intelligibly, as there may not be invariant probability measures that can be compared against each other.
It should also be noted that the iterated expectations characterization is significant because it provides, in principle, a way of calculating a common prior given a type space. In the finite state space context, one can form the type matrices and apply numerical solutions for calculating invariant probability measures in Markov chains -a subject of active research -in order to ascertain whether or not there is a common prior and if one exists, to identify it. Similarly, with the extension here of the iterated expectations characterization to the more general compact spaces, it now becomes possible, given knowledge of the players' type spaces, in principle to estimate the expected values of random variables by use of numerical solutions, such as those appearing in e.g. Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2003) .
The following rough correspondences exist between results in this paper and those that appear in Samet (1998a) , save for the fact that the results in that paper are strictly limited to finite state spaces, whereas that restriction is lifted here: Proposition 1 here is (roughly) an infinite state space version of Proposition 4 of Samet (1998a) ; Proposition 2 here corresponds to Proposition 5 of Samet (1998a) ; and similarly Proposition 3 corresponds to Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 to Theorem 1 .
Preliminary definitions and results

Type spaces
A type space for a set of players is a tuple I, Ω, F , ϕ, (Π i , t i ) i∈I . The set of players is denoted by I = {1, . . . ,n}, where n 2. Ω is a measurable space of arbitrary cardinality, whose elements are called states. F is a σ -field of events (subsets of Ω), and ϕ a non-trivial σ -finite measure. For each player i ∈ I , Π i is a partition of Ω, which may be termed player i's knowledge partition, and t i (·, ω) denotes a belief -or probability measure on (Ω, F ) -associated with each player i at each state. We further assume that each element of each partition Π i is an element of F (and therefore that the atoms of the knowledge partitions of each player are F -measurable), and that ϕ(Π i ) > 0. The collection (Π i ) i∈I is termed a partition profile, and will sometimes be denoted here by Π.
The probability measures t i (·, ω) for each player i and each state ω are required to satisfy:
The meet of Π, denoted ∧ Π, is the partition of Ω that is the finest among all partitions that are coarser than Π i for each i. For each ω, ∧ Π(ω) denotes the element of the meet containing ω. A somewhat more constructive way to define the elements of the meet utilizes the concept of reachability. A state ω is reachable from ω if there exists a sequence
It is well known that ω ∈ ∧ Π(ω) iff ω is reachable from ω, and therefore the relation of reachability can be used to define the meet. This characterization of the meet will be used in proofs in the body of this paper. For an event A, the event that
A is common knowledge is the union of all the elements of ∧ Π contained in A.
A random variable is a real-valued function on Ω. For a probability measure ν and a random variable f on Ω, the expectation of f with respect to ν is ν f := Ω f (ω) dν(ω). For each player i and random variable f , i's expectation of f , denoted E i f is the random variable
Given a type space, one can ask whether the space might have come to exist, in its current state, from a space with no information at all, by the players acquiring new information over time and updating their beliefs in a Bayesian manner. Each player's possible initial belief on the no-information primeval space is called a prior. In general, given player i's current type, there will not be a single prior, but a set of possible priors. A main question is then whether or not the players have a common prior.
More formally, a probability measure μ over (Ω, F ) is a prior for player i if for every event A ∈ F ,
A probability measure is a common prior if it is a prior for each of the players i ∈ I .
Markov transitions
When working with a finite state space, a Markov chain is typically represented by a series of random variables {X 1 , X 2 , . . .} along with a transition matrix M, such that the (i, j)-th element of M is the probability that X n+1 = j given that X n = i.
In transferring this idea to a more general state space, we cannot always expect to measure the probability that the value of a random variable in a successive time period will be a specific state, but we can ask what the probability is that it will be in an event. In formulae, if (Ω, F ) is a measurable space, (X, B, P) a probability space, E an event in F , and {ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . .} is a sequence of Ω-valued random variables defined on X , our analogue of the transition matrix will be given by
This motivates the standard definition of a general Markov transition probability function:
One of the most important aspects of finite state Markov transitions is the interpretation of the n-th power of a Markov transition matrix as representing the n-th step of iterating the transition probabilities encoded in the matrix. The analogue in general state spaces iterates a Markov transition probability function M by the following recursive definition:
In the rest of this section, fix a Markov transition probability function M.
Let (Ω) denote the space of probability measures on Ω, with this space naturally outfitted with the induced weak* topology. It is possible to regard M as a function from (Ω) to (Ω), as follows:
Then M acts on (Ω) by way of ν → νM. Using this notation, a probability measure ν is invariant with respect to M if ν = νM. If such a measure exists, M is said to admit an invariant probability measure.
The transition probability function M can also be considered as operating on bounded functions in the following way.
For each bounded integrable function
If ν is an invariant probability measure with respect to M, then M can also be considered to be a linear operator on
We have in addition the concept of the Cesàro mean, defined as
If Ω has a topology τ , denote the class of bounded continuous functions with respect to τ from Ω to R by C (Ω). Then
M satisfies the weak Feller property if M maps C (Ω) to C (Ω).
Given the underlying space (Ω,
We will make use of the following important theorems from the theory of Markov chains. These three theorems appear in Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2003) THEOREM (Existence of invariant probability measure). Let Ω be a compact metric space, and let M be a Markov transition function on Ω. Then M admits an invariant probability measure.
THEOREM (Uniqueness of invariant probability measure). Let M be a ϕ-irreducible Markov transition function and suppose that M admits an invariant probability measure ν. Then ν is the unique invariant probability measure for M.
THEOREM (Birkhoff's Ergodic Theorem for Markov processes). Let M be a Markov transition function that admits an invariant probability measure ν.
In addition, if ν is the unique invariant probability measure of M, then f * is constant ν-almost everywhere, and f * = f dν, ν-almost everywhere, so the time-average lim n→∞ M (n) f = the space-average f dν, ν-a.e.
Type spaces within the Markov framework
Relating type spaces to Markov processes
In this section, we relate the concepts of type spaces and Markov processes (similarly to the way this is accomplished in Samet, 2000) .
First, note that by definition, the probability measure t i (·|·) associated with each player i satisfies the conditions for being a Markov transition probability function, hence we can relate to it as such. We will relabel t i (·|·) as M i in the sequel when we wish to emphasize we are treating it as a Markov transition.
In general, given any two probability measures P 1 and P 2 , one can define a new probability measure P 2 P 1 (E|ω) by
This obviously can be iterated any number of times. In particular, given a measure P , we can construct an infinite sequence of measures {P n (·|ω) n 1 }. In our specific context, given any two players i and j and a measurable event E, the probability measure t i t j (E|ω) based on t i and t j is similarly defined by
In particular, given an element σ in Sym(I), the set of all permutations of the elements of I , define
iteratively, by using the above to define t σ (n−1) t σ n , then t σ n−2 (t σ (n−1) t σ n ), and so on.
We can now re-interpret various notions relating to a type space within the Markov framework. First, note that for any function f on the state space, M i f is precisely the expectation of f in player i's estimation (cf. Samet, 2000) . This expectation is what is usually considered of economic significance and importance, as players choose their actions by comparing the relative expectations of functions.
Complementary to this, an invariant probability measure ν with respect to the Markov chain M i is precisely a prior of player i. A common prior is a probability measure that is simultaneously invariant with respect to all {M i } i∈I .
A sequence s = (i 1 , i 2 , . . .) of elements of I is called an I -sequence if for each player j, i k = j for infinitely many ks.
The iterated expectation of a random variable f with respect to the I -sequence s is the sequence of random variables
. Given the identification of E i f with M i f , we can write, given a permutation σ of I ,
and term this a permutation chain.
The iterated expectation of f with respect to σ is the sequence {E
, and the Cesàro iterated expectation of f with respect
. The iterated expectation of f with respect to σ is the iterated expectation of f with respect to the I -sequence σ 1 , . . . , σ n , σ 1 , . . . , σ n , . . .
as defined above. It should be noted here that the results in this paper do not extend all the results of Samet (1998a) to compact metric spaces. To be precise, the claims of that paper, in the finite type space context, show that the existence of a common prior implies that for each random variable f it is common knowledge in each state that all the iterated expectations of f , with respect to all I -sequences s, converge to the same limit. The claims of this paper show that, in the context of a compact e.m.p. type space (as defined in the next section), the existence of a common prior implies that for each random variable f it is common knowledge in each state that the Cesàro iterated expectations of f with respect to each permutation converge to the same limit, but not with respect to all I -sequences. The intuitive reason for working with everywhere mutually positive spaces is that we wish to relate together the main elements with which we are working, namely the partitional structure, the type probabilities, the topology, and the underlying measure on the space. Consider, for example, three states ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , that are reachable one from the other by way of ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Π i (ω 1 ) and ω 2 , ω 3 ∈ Π j (ω 3 ), for players i = j. As these states are connected from the perspective of the partitional structure, we want them to be "connected" also in the sense of Markov transitions, that is, intuitively speaking, we want there to be a positive probability of transitioning to ω 3 from ω 1 . This means avoiding situations in which, e.g., there is non-zero probability of transitioning from ω 2 to ω 3 according to t j , but the transition from ω 1 "gets stuck" because t i assigns zero probability to transitioning from ω 1 to ω 2 , or because the underlying measure ϕ assigns zero probability to 
Everywhere mutually positive type space
every event in Π i (ω 2 ) ∩ Π j (ω 2 ).ω, ω ∈ Π σ (i) (ω), there is a ϕ-non-null event A(ω) such that t σ (A(ω)| ω) > 0.
Proof. Let ω, ω ∈ Π σ (i) (ω). By property (1) of e.m.p. type spaces, there exist ϕ-non-null events
We now unravel the recursive definition of t σ (1) . .
Similar reasoning can be applied at the transition point from t σ (i+1) . . . t σ (n) to t σ (i) . . . t σ (n)
, and the transition point Next, select an event E ⊆ Q such that ϕ(E) > 0, and a state ω ∈ E. Let ω ∈ Q be selected arbitrarily. Since ω ∈ ∧ Π(ω ), there exists a sequence {ω = ω 0 , ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω m = ω } such that for each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, there exists a player i k such
We can now define the following iterative process: by definition, there is a player i 0 such that
At step 0 of the iterative process, we conclude from Lemma 1 the existence of a ϕ-non-null event A(ω 1 ) such that
. Applying the same reasoning as above, there is a At the end of the process, the conclusion is t
Finally, from ϕ(E) > 0 and the assumption that the type space is an e.m.p. space, we have t σ (k) (E|ω = ω m ) > 0 for all k ∈ I . By a slight tweaking of the proof of Lemma 1, using the fact that ω ∈ A(ω ) ∩ E and that for all k, t σ (k) (A(ω ) Proof. This is the compact-space equivalent result to Proposition 5 of Samet (1998a) , and the proof is nearly identical. Almost immediately from the definitions, 1) and 2) are equivalent. That 2) implies 3) is quite readily seen: if πt i = π for each player, then one can successively calculate π(t σ (1) . . . t σ (n) ) = π(t σ (2) . . . t σ (n) ) = · · · = πt σ (n) = π , for any permutation σ .
It remains to show that 3) implies 2). Suppose 3), and let π be the invariant probability measure. Thus
Multiplying from the right by t 1 gives (n) σ f is constantly π σ f , π σ -almost everywhere, where π σ is the unique invariant probability measure of M σ on Ω. Thus, for each f , the limits for all σ are respectively π σ -a.e. equal to each other iff for each f , π σ f are π σ -a.e. constantly equal to the same value for all σ .
Clearly, if there is a probability measure π such that π σ = π for all σ , then the π σ f are all equal to each other. In the other direction, if in particular for each A ∈ F , the π σ χ A are all equal, then there is a probability measure π such that π σ = π for all σ . This amounts, given previous propositions, to saying that π is a common prior. 2
We can summarize these results as follows: 
On the use of Cesàro means
In Samet (1998a) In either case, π cannot be a normalized probability.
Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, in this paper we have extended most of the results of Samet (1998a) to compact e.m.p. type spaces and shown that compactness is necessary for the proofs of the results. As noted in Section 3, whether our results on compact e.m.p. type spaces also apply with respect to all I -sequences remains an open question.
